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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cybersecurity is a rapidly developing field designed to protect information systems 
from continual risk. Cybersecurity has been at the forefront of conflicts, politics, 
and both enterprise and military attacks. Cyber threats present  unique concerns for 
all governments, including challenges to their ability to operate and defend critical 
systems. This paper provides an overview of the important role that cybersecurity 
has in the United States, framed by military capability planning, and explains how 
mass workforce development models, such as the National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Capability Maturity Model and NICE 
Framework, provide a methodology to enhance human resource capabilities. 
Furthermore, this work examines several initiatives designed to provide for national 
cybersecurity needs and suggests how a well-equipped cybersecurity workforce can 
be enhanced by using strategic recruitment and building a talent pipeline. 
 
Important Cyber Challenges 
 
In February 2017, the Department of Defense Science Board (DSB) released a 
report titled Task Force on Cyber Deterrence that raised several concerns. First, the 
agency recognized that the U.S. military has an extensive dependence on 
information technology, which creates a massive attack surface. Second, the report 
noted that major powers such as Russia and China have an increasing capacity to 
hold U.S. critical infrastructure at risk or to use information they gather to damage 
vital U.S. interests. Though currently limited, foes’ ability to obstruct United 
States’ military responses through cyberattacks continues to develop (Department 
of Defense Science Board [DSB], 2017). 
 
The DSB concluded that the offensive cyber capabilities of the United States’ 
adversaries are likely to “far exceed the United States’ ability to defend and 
adequately strengthen the resilience of its critical infrastructures” in the coming five 
to ten years (DSB, 2017). Therefore, it is necessary for the United States to improve 
its cyber posture to mitigate the extensive vulnerabilities to nations such as Russia, 
China, North Korea, and others. Although the results of the DSB report focus on 
the United States, it is critical for U.S. allies to strengthen their cyber capabilities 
as well. The majority of serious militaries around the world either have cyber 
capabilities or they desire to develop such abilities (Wallace, 2013). As a result, 
having a framework to help military cyber capability planning is an area in which 
a more refined system is necessary. 
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Military Cybersecurity Capabilities: “Leverage the Nation’s Ingenuity 
Through an Exceptional Cyber Workforce” 
 
Militaries play an important role in national cybersecurity governance. In 2011, the 
United States Department of Defense (DoD) released a document defining its 
strategy for operating in cyberspace. The plan consists of five strategic initiatives. 
The first is to treat cyberspace as an operational domain that should be organized, 
educated, and prepared to ensure DoD’s capability to take advantage of 
cyberspace’s potential. The second step is to “employ new defense operating 
concepts to protect Department of Defense networks and systems.” The third 
strategic initiative is for the DoD to partner with other U.S. government 
departments and agencies, as well as the private sector, to enable a “whole-of-
government cybersecurity strategy.” This would include developing new 
capabilities and supporting collective efforts among government agencies, Internet 
Service Providers, and global supply chains. The fourth strategic initiative is to 
build a robust relationship with U.S. allies and international partners to increase 
collective cybersecurity. The final initiative is to “leverage the nation’s ingenuity 
through an exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation” (DoD, 
2011). These strategies are important to national security, which is being redefined 
by cyberspace, in the United States and other countries. Although cyberspace 
provides opportunities to militaries, it also presents significant challenges. As a 
result, the recommended strategic initiatives would allow the DoD to capitalize on 
the opportunities within cyberspace, focus on protecting networks and systems 
from intrusions, and build strong cyberspace capabilities  
  
Capability-Based Planning. There are several definitions of capability-based 
planning (CBP). CBP can be defined as a systematic technique applied to 
“functional analysis of operational requirements” in which capabilities are 
identified based on a set of requirements and then satisfied using the most cost-
effective options available (The Technical Cooperation Program Joint Systems and 
Analysis Group [TCPJSAG], n.d.). CBP has also been referred to as the “planning, 
under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day 
challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that 
necessitates choice” (TCPJSAG, n.d.). CBP was “developed as an alternative to 
threat-based planning” (TCPJSAG, n.d.). Threat-based planning is developing 
plans with “clear and identifiable benchmarks” (Balasevicius, 2016) based on an 
identifiable enemy enacting a specific scenario. In recent years, critics have argued 
that threat-based planning was too restrictive to apprehend the range of expected 
future military engagements (Hicks, 2017). CBP emerged in an attempt to better 
provide a rational framework for decision making and allow plans to be more 
responsive to uncertainty, economic constraints, and associated risks (TCPJSAG, 
3 
 
n.d.). Simply stated, CBP allows the development of strategies without limiting the 
analysis to a specific enemy or threat. 
 
Furthermore, CBP focuses on an end goal, followed by an analysis of what needs 
to be done. The more information about a specific threat or scenario there is, the 
better military capabilities can be built. Additionally, the concept of CBP 
“recognizes the interdependence of systems (including materiel and people), 
doctrine, organization and support in delivering defense capability, and the need to 
be able to examine options and trade-offs among these capability elements in terms 
of performance, cost and risk so as to identify optimum force development 
investments” (TCPJSAG, n.d.). CBP “relies on scenarios to provide the context 
against which to measure the level of capability” (TCPJSAG, n.d.). For example, 
cyber capabilities include responding to crises, monitoring networks, protecting 
systems, testing penetration, supporting operations, and educating stakeholders. 
Cyber capability planning may begin with an end goal of protecting an information 
system, and then identify the tasks that would need to be accomplished to achieve 
that goal within a certain budget or utilization of resources. 
 
According to TCPJSAG, there are several components to effective CBP. First, CBP 
should be output oriented, with “high-level capability objectives derived from 
government guidance.”  Second, CBP should consider “the way in which the force 
that is going to be used will fight,” which typically comes from top-level doctrines. 
Third, CBP should cluster or partition groups of similar processes to make them 
manageable. Fourth, the resulting capabilities must be accomplished with the 
available resources (TCPJSAG, n.d.). These four components include the concepts 
of strategic, operational, and employment frequently found in militaries. 
  
Challenges of CBP. Since CBP has been traditionally used in the military, it is 
integrated in the national budget and is a topic used in military readiness debates. 
Therefore, converting CBP from a strictly military planning strategy to one that 
includes civilian requirements, as is the case with cyber, presents a challenge. In 
the case of workforce development, it is difficult to realize the third and fourth rules 
from the TCPJSAG (n.d.) previously described, i.e. that CBP should partition 
groups of similar processes to make them manageable and that the resulting 
capabilities should be accomplished given the available resources. It is challenging 
to know the what cyber skills are needed and being produced in the civilian and 
military sectors. This lack of clarity creates a national challenge. Until these 
features are specified, it is difficult for cybersecurity training to be attuned to 
workforce needs (Li and Daugherty, 2015). 
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The major difficulty in aligning cybersecurity capability and need is a lack of a 
sufficient number of cybersecurity workers. The United States’ best defense to 
emerging cyber threats is to “develop a robust, agile, and highly trained 
cybersecurity workforce. However, to build this workforce, organizations must 
have an understanding of their current supply as well as approaches to identify and 
meet future demand” (Department of Homeland Security, 2014).  It is easy to 
recognize the important role that cybersecurity workers have in national defense 
and capability planning, however, there is a lack of cybersecurity workers in the 
workforce in relation to the number of positions that need to be filled. Moreover, 
beyond the current need for cybersecurity capabilities, even more cybersecurity 
workers will be needed in the future. 
  
In February 2017, the Global Information Security Workforce Study from (ISC)2 
identified a workforce gap between cybersecurity workers demanded and those able 
to fill those rolls. The consortium projects a shortage of 1.8 million workers by the 
year 2022 (International Information System Security Certification Consortium, 
2017). In addition, CyberSeek projects that there are, at the time of writing, 285,681 
total cybersecurity job openings with a very low supply of cybersecurity workers 
(CyberSeek, n.d.). The scarcity of qualified cybersecurity workers is a major issue 
for the federal government. In 2015 the former Federal CIO (the U.S. Government’s 
Chief Information Officer), Tony Scott estimated more than 10,000 openings for 
cyber workers without enough individuals to fill those positions (Ravindranath, 
2015). Policymakers must address this deficit by creating a pipeline in which 
individuals may be first trained in cybersecurity, and then hired and retained in the 
government cybersecurity workforce. 
  
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) released a memorandum in 2016 
titled Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Strategy. The purpose of this memo was to 
identify goals and desired outcomes for strategic recruitment. The memo was 
created to “engage in Government-wide and agency-specific efforts to conduct 
outreach and recruitment for cybersecurity talent and improve and expand on 
existing hiring and retention efforts” in order to increase the “pipeline of 
cybersecurity talent entering the federal workforce, including candidates who have 
not traditionally considered federal employment, and provide reliable and effective 
human resources services that enable agencies to immediately fill vacancies” 
(OPM, 2017). One way that this can be accomplished is through outreach to 
multiple stakeholders, including public, private, and academic sectors as a way to 
raise awareness for career paths and scholarship opportunities, such as the 
CyberCorps Scholarship for Service (SFS) and DoD Information Assurance 
Scholarship Program (IASP) (OPM, 2017). 
 
5 
 
Steps Toward Capability Planning and Workforce Development 
 
In 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released its first version of 
a cybersecurity capability maturity model, referred to as the NICE Capability 
Maturity Model (CMM). This capability maturity model was created to provide a 
framework that organizations can use as a “baseline for current capabilities in 
cybersecurity workforce planning” (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 
2014). This method also enables organizations to compare their capabilities to each 
other and give decision makers the information needed to support increased 
cybersecurity human capital initiatives (DHS, 2014). 
    
The NICE CMM document is divided into three main areas: “process and 
analytics,” “integrated governance,” and “skilled practitioners and enabling 
technology.” Process represents the activities associated with planning and building 
organizational processes, while analytics refers to the activities related to supply 
and demand data, tools, and models for workforce planning analysis. Integrated 
governance includes events related to establishing and developing governance 
structures, such as assignments of responsibility. Finally, the skilled practitioners 
section provides information on establishing a professional workforce and enabling 
technology to be used for data systems (DHS, 2014). 
  
The NICE CMM also contains three maturity levels, ranging from the most basic 
level to achieving a fully developed workforce. The first level, designated 
“limited,” addresses the start of development with limited established processes, 
lack of clear guidance, or few analysis methods. The second level, termed 
“progressing,” refers to the stage in which some cybersecurity workforce planning 
aspects have been established and some infrastructure supports workforce planning. 
The final level is termed “maturity,” which includes optimal cybersecurity 
workforce planning capability, integration with business processes, and adequate 
workload analysis, which together guide decision making for the cybersecurity 
workforce (DHS, 2014). This model can be used to evaluate the current state of the 
cybersecurity workforce among military branches, and then create goals to enhance 
the workforce and move from a “limited” level to a “maturity” level. In short, the 
model allows readers to understand the processes, methods, and infrastructure in 
place and identify the level of support that the cyber workforce is achieving. This 
identification can help address shortcomings and then better enable training 
programs, including academic programs, that prepare candidates to fulfill 
capability needs. 
  
In 2009, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), along with 
strong leadership from DHS and the DoD, developed the NICE Cybersecurity 
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Workforce Framework, which can be found in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-
181 (NIST, 2017). This framework was developed as a resource to allow for a more 
effective method of identifying, recruiting, developing and maintaining its 
cybersecurity talent. This can be utilized as a foundation for the development of 
training standards for the cybersecurity workforce. 
  
The NICE framework consists of seven categories of common cybersecurity 
functions: analyze, collect and operate, investigate, operate and maintain, oversee 
and govern, protect and defend, and securely provision (NIST, 2017). Each 
category has specialty areas that define distinct areas of cybersecurity work. Within 
each specialty area are identified specific knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) 
to perform tasks in a work role. For example, in the category of operate and 
maintain there is a specialty area of data administration. Within data administration  
are the ability to maintain databases, knowledge of computer networking and 
privacy principles, and the skill to generate queries and reports required to complete 
the tasks required by a data administrator, such as analyzing and planning for 
changes in data capacity requirements (NIST, 2017). 
  
The NICE framework strives to engage government, academia, and industry in an 
attempt to raise the proficiency and capability of information security professionals 
(Newhouse, Keith, Scribner, Witte, 2017). As noted earlier, cybersecurity 
workforce capabilities are essential to the success of capability planning. However, 
there remains a deficit of cybersecurity practitioners, especially in the government 
setting. This is concerning for national security. 
  
Workforce Incentives. Programs such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
CyberCorps SFS and the DoD IASP should be further expanded in an attempt to 
meet the current and future demand of cybersecurity practitioners in the 
government. Both of these scholarship programs pay for students’ education in 
cybersecurity related degrees (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2017). After 
scholarship recipients complete their education, they are required to work in a 
cybersecurity related field for a United States government organization. The fiscal 
year 2018 budget request allocates $55 million for CyberCorps SFS, with a focus 
on veterans (NSF, 2018). That amount of funding would allow over 2,000 students 
to complete the program (McAfee, 2018). Given the extent of the cybersecurity 
deficit, this is not enough to sufficiently decrease the workforce gap. 
  
Another challenge facing SFS and IASP programs is the verification process. 
Colleges and universities that are interested in participating in SFS need to be 
designated by the National Security Agency and Department of Homeland Security 
as Centers of Academic Excellence (NSA/DHS CAE) for Cyber Defense Education 
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(CDE) and Cyber Operations (CO) and deemed equivalent to the certified schools 
(U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2017). The NSA/DHS CAE designation 
process verifies that certified programs will educate students in a manner that will 
allow them to be successful working in a government agency. The primary goal of 
the CAE-CDE/CO programs is to “reduce vulnerability in our national information 
infrastructure by promoting higher education and research in cyber defense and 
producing professionals with cyber defense expertise for the Nation” (National 
Security Agency, 2016). 
    
Rigorous assessments are required to certify colleges and universities. All CAE-
CD institutions must have a curriculum that meets the criteria established by the 
NSA in conjunction with NICE and the NICE Workforce Framework (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2017). Thus, the process of verifying 
schools that can then establish scholarship programs to train students for 
cybersecurity positions in the government is already in place, but adequate funding 
is required for the program to be successful. 
 
Workforce Pipeline. For three successive presidential administrations, 
cybersecurity focused CAE programs have been studied, discussed, and verbally 
supported.  Most recently, the 2016 Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP) 
proposed that $62 million be invested in cybersecurity personnel, including 
strengthening the National CAE in Cybersecurity program (Office of the Press 
Secretary, 2016). Unfortunately, no funding lines have been created to sustain this 
important capability. Without funding, the existence of the CAE process, the 
process of validating schools for participation, and ensuring that students are 
properly trained may be jeopardized. Ensuring allocated funds for this purpose can 
help decrease the deficit of cybersecurity workers entering the government 
workforce. Funding is urgently needed as designated CAE schools require 
validation renewal and additional schools seek verification. Currently, there are 242 
schools recognized with at least one CAE designation. Approximately 11,400 
students graduated from CAE-CD institutions in 2017 (Centers of Academic 
Excellence, 2017). If more schools receive CAE certification, additional students 
will receive the necessary education to fill the growing number of cybersecurity job 
vacancies and help meet capability gaps. 
  
K-12. Moreover elementary and high school students, should be exposed to 
cybersecurity topics during such a critical time in their development to help 
facilitate a knowledgeable population and stimulate entry into cybersecurity fields. 
This is especially important because training individuals who do not have any cyber 
skills can be costly. Instead, it is often cheaper and more efficient to build a pipeline 
of candidates with pre-existing skills (Li and Daugherty, 2015). One example by 
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which early skill building can be enhanced is by expanding the use of GenCyber 
camps. According to GenCyber, its summer cybersecurity camps provide 
experiences for students and teachers at the K-12 level. The goals of GenCyber are 
to increase student interest in cybersecurity careers and to improve teaching 
methods and curricula. GenCyber has grown from eight camps in 2014 to 149 
camps that will host more than 5,300 students and teachers in 2018. From 2014 to 
2017, more than 10,000 students and teachers have attended GenCyber camps. 
Inspiring young people and encouraging them to pursue cybersecurity is an 
important aspect to supplying the career pipeline and increasing cyber capabilities. 
(GenCyber, n.d.) Funding for GenCyber was provided by the NSA and the NSF, 
but there is currently no Congressional funding allocated to these camps, as the 
program has been treated as a pilot. Without adequate funding, there is the potential 
that these camps will not occur. In short, there is a nationally developed program 
without a funding line. 
 
Other DoD Scholarships and Camps. The DoD also offers several other STEM 
scholarships. These include the National Defense and Engineering Graduate 
Fellowship (NDSEG), the Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation 
(SMART) SFS, and the Stokes Education Scholarship Program (DoD STEM, 
2018). 
 
Two other established camps aimed at fostering youth cyber education include 
CyberPatriot, a National Youth Cyber Education Program created by the Air Force 
Association (CyberPatriot, 2013) and InfraGard Cyber Camps, which are 
cybersecurity camps for youth offered through a partnership between the FBI and 
members of the private sector.  
  
CONCLUSION 
 
The U.S. federal government workforce lacks a sufficient number of cybersecurity 
workers, and given that cyber threats continue to grow, a workforce that is capable 
of protecting the United States’ cyberspace is necessary. One potential pipeline for 
cybersecurity practitioners that work for the federal government currently exists, 
but it lacks adequate funding. Sufficient funding has the potential to bridge the gap 
between a currently understaffed cyber workforce and the cyber capabilities that 
the United States requires. Military cyber capability planning can be enhanced with 
the use of the NICE Framework as a basis for training, developing, and maintaining 
cybersecurity talent. This methodology focuses on developing a knowledgeable and 
skilled cybersecurity workforce. GenCyber camps and scholarship programs 
provide other potential sources for K-12 education and talent pools from which 
college students might be recruited to work for government agencies and the 
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military, but aspects of these programs remain unfunded. To reduce the gap 
between the number of cybersecurity workers needed in the government setting and 
those currently being supplied, academia programs must be expanded and the 
agencies that validate CAE schools should receive adequate funding. Such actions 
could reduce the deficit of cybersecurity workers and enhance military cyber 
capabilities. 
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